29 May 1958

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CENTRAL

INTELLIGENCE

BULLETIN




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Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt

no	Taiwan: Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek's son, Chiang Ching-kuo, stated recently that Col. Warouw, acting premier of the Indonesian dissident movement,	
	had arrived in Taipei and had requested Chinese Nationalist air support for the dissidents. Chiang stated that the Chinese Nationalists had not reached a decision to give aid to the dissidents.	
No	Greece: Prime Minister Karamanlis has warned the American ambassador that if the British proposals on Cyprus, which are expected in the near future, are unsatisfactory, the government will be forced to take a harder line on Cyprus to prevent the Communists from exploiting this issue. Karamanlis probably wants to line up more American support on the Cyprus issue, but in any case he has to face a more vocal and determined opposition.	
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yes [zuelan junta's new cabinet an attempted take-over by general staff chief Perez Mofficer corps has for some	ons may be aroused by the Vene- appointments, and the chances of Defense Minister Castro and Morales could be increased. The etime been concerned by junta assivity in the face of a rapid	f
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	29 May 58 DAILY	BRIEF iv	

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

Moscow Suspends Economic Credits to Belgrade

The USSR advised Yugoslavia on 27 May of its intention to suspend for five years the two big development loans it had extended Belgrade two years ago. This move marks a new stage in the deterioration of interstate relations which has followed the bloc-Belgrade ideological rupture. Since the Soviet credits are to be used chiefly to provide equipment for industrial construction now in the planning stage, their cancellation will not cause an economic crisis in Yugoslavia.

Approximately \$278,000,000 in credits are involved, including the joint East German - Soviet \$175,000,000 credit for the construction of an aluminum plant. The Yugoslav announcement of the Soviet decision did not mention, however, a \$54,000,000 commodity credit extended during February 1956, of which about \$28,000,000 remains to be drawn. The USSR noted, in suspending the credits, that the possibility existed 'for some compensation on the basis of current goods exchanges.' As yet, there has been no mention that Czechoslovakia and Poland intendate follow Moscow's lead and cancel approximately \$90,000,000 in credits they have extended to Yugoslavia.

The hint of a possibility of some compensatory arrangement suggests that no immediate complete economic boycott-such as ensued after the 1948 break--is contemplated.

The Soviet decision, which was probably discussed at the recent CEMA meeting in Moscow, suggests that the USSR does not contemplate any resolution of the current dispute in the foreseeable future. Moscow apparently is willing to risk any unfavorable effects its obviously political action may have in India and other uncommitted states where the USSR has been careful to avoid attaching political strings to its aid.

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Peiping Renews Attack on Belgrade

The 23 May resolution of the Chinese Communist party congress exceeds in harshness Peiping's 5 May blast against Belgrade, and charges the Yugoslav leaders played a ''provocateur and interventionist' role in Hungary.

In language resembling the 1948 Cominform resolution which expelled Yugoslavia, Peiping declares that the Yugoslav leaders have "alienated themselves" from the international Communist movement. The resolution pointedly distinguishes between Yugoslav leaders and the populace.

The resolution reflects the tone of the entire proceedings of the Chinese party congress, which reaffirmed hard lines in domestic and foreign policy. Mao Tse-tung and his most influential lieutenants in the past year have increasingly stood for ideological orthodoxy, tighter organizational controls, and greater pressures on the populace for rapid economic development. The Chinese resolution charges that the Yugoslav program 'betrays' Marxism and that the Yugoslavs have 'completely forsaken' the concept of Communist party power monopoly.

In order to counter any speculation that the Chinese are supporting Stalinist opponents of Khrushchev, Peiping for the second time in a week makes a special point of its support for Khrushchev personally. The resolution endorses the measures taken since 1954 toward Yugoslavia by the Soviet central committee, "headed by Comrade N. S. Khrushchev."

Yugoslavia's Borba regards the Chinese resolution as the death knell for the pleas for "well-meaning criticism" which have been voiced by some East European spokesmen. The paper comments that the old methods of the Cominform have again been put into practice.

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Greek Premier Warns Against Unacceptable Cyprus Proposals

Premier Karamanlis told the American ambassador to Greece on 26 May that a solution to the Cyprus problem is now urgent. The premier attributed sizable Communist gains in the recent Greek national elections, along with the decline of his own pro-Western party, to the resentment felt by the Greek people toward Britain, Turkey, and the United States for their attitudes on Cyprus.

Karamanlis warned that to prevent further exploitation of this bitterness he would be forced to adopt a more unvielding attitude toward the Cyprus problem unless the forthcoming British proposals are acceptable. He denied that the Greek Government has any contact with, or influence over, the Greek Cypriot underground organization EOKA, but predicted that "great violence" would follow announcement of any unacceptable British plan. This in turn, he warned, could lead to communal clashes on the island and a possible rupture in Greek-Turkish relations. Karamanlis concluded with an urgent plea that the United States use its influence to convince Britain and Turkey that they must act to bring about an acceptable solution.

Domestic problems were probably as much responsible as foreign issues for the recent display of leftist strength in Greece. The proven vote-getting power of the Communists is now large enough, however, to influence the conduct of Greek foreign policy for the indefinite future. If Britain's new plan for Cyprus is unacceptable to Archbishop Makarios and the Greek Cypriots, Karamanlis will be forced to take a firm stand favoring Cypriot selfdetermination or risk further left-wing gains in Greek

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municipal elections next October.

Moroccan Government Approves Establishment of Soviet Commercial Mission

The Moroccan Government is reported to have approved unanimously on 22 May a Soviet request for permission to establish a permanent commercial mission in Casablanca. The conclusion in Moscow on 20 April of a new trade agreement with the USSR, providing for an exchange of goods valued at \$14,200,000 and the establishment of clearing accounts in Rabat and Moscow, in Moroccan eyes has invalidated the standing argument that a trade mission was not needed because trade was inconsequential. Under the 1957 agreement, Moroccan trade with the USSR expanded rapidly. During the first nine months of 1957, trade was valued at \$3,672,000, in contrast to \$204,000 during the same period of 1956. Despite this expansion, Soviet trade amounted to only slightly more than one percent of Morocco's total trade.

While Morocco has been cool to Soviet approaches, and Premier Balafrej and the King personally oppose closer relations, the government since March has been seriously considering an exchange of diplomatic representatives with the USSR. Establishment of a commercial mission now provides a new contact and opportunity for the USSR to press for expanded relations.

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29 May 58 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

III. THE WEST

French Crisis

Further efforts by President Coty to give maximum legality to General de Gaulle's assumption of power have delayed the expected direct presidential request that the general form a new government. Coty's designation of the presidents of the two houses of Parliament late 28 May to negotiate with De Gaulle has brought heavy pressure to bear on the recalcitrant Socialist party—the main stum—bling block to a legal investiture.

There are indications that the pro-De Gaulle forces may have underestimated the depth of Socialist opposition to any form of De Gaulle regime and the willingness of at least a segment of the party to make good the threat, privately advanced by several leaders, to "go underground" regardless of how De Gaulle takes power. According to the press, even a "pathetic plea" by Socialist leader Mollet to Socialist deputies on 28 May failed to sway a majority of them.

Continued Socialist opposition, by encouraging the Communists and probably other anti-Gaullist elements, enhances the possibility of momentary military intervention which had seemed slightly less imminent following De Gaulle's 27 May announcement that he was preparing to form a government and his request for the maintenance of public order. The prospects for a violent leftist opposition movement also are increased by prolonged resistance of "republican" elements in the Assembly.

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Venezuelan Junta Appoints New Cabinet

New tensions may be created in Venezuela by the governing junta's new cabinet appointments. Finance Minister Mayobre, a banker and former governor of the International Monetary Fund, is reported to have been at one time closely connected with Communist party affairs; he was exiled by the Perez Jimenez dictatorship in 1952. Foreign Minister de Sola, formerly minister of justice, was active in the overthrow of the Perez regime and is said to be popular with Caracas' leftist-inclined, antimilitarist students. Education Minister Rafael Pizani, exiled by the Perez Jimenez regime, was the leading proponent under conservative President Medina in 1943 of the provision for a 50-50 return to the government on petroleum revenues. Agriculture Minister Hernandez, an agronomist, and Justice Minister Aguilar, who was secretary of the Caracas bar association in 1954, appear to have been inactive politically.

The new appointments may precipitate an attempt at a take—over by Defense Minister Castro and general staff chief Perez Morales. The officer corps has for some time been concerned over junta President Larrazabal's passivity in the face of the rapid rise of leftist influence.			
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29 May 58 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 10